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Unfair Trade Practices and Unfair Methods of Competition in
North Carolina: Are Both Treble and Punitive Damages
Available for Violations of Section 75-1.1?
North Carolina General Statutes section 75-1.1 prohibits "unfair methods

of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."' Section 75-16 establishes a private cause of

action for "any person, firm or corporation" injured by a violation of section
75-1.1.2 Any damages assessed pursuant to section 75-1.1 are trebled automat-

ically. 3 Whether a plaintiff seeking relief under section 75-1.1 may recover
punitive damages in addition to treble damages is unsettled. North Carolina

courts never have awarded both statutory treble damages and punitive damages;4 they have, however, stopped short of declaring treble and punitive dam5
ages to be mutually exclusive.

Most recently, the availability of the statutory treble damages and puni-

tive damages was considered in tlanticPurchasers,Inc. v. AircraftSales,Inc.6
In this diversity action, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit denied an award of treble and punitive damages. Although the result
was reached on grounds other than mutual exclusivity, 7 the majority of the
court expressed doubt that the North Carolina courts would uphold an award
of punitive damages and statutory treble damages. 8 A review of the North
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981).
2. Id. § 75-16.
3. Id See also Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 547, 276 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1981).
4. See, e.g., Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981); Hardy v. Toler, 288
N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975); Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 229, 259 S.E.2d 1,
disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979); Rosenthal v. Perkins, 42 N.C. App. 449, 257
S.E.2d 63 (1979); Stone v. Paradise Park Homes, Inc., 37 N.C. App. 97, 245 S.E.2d 801, disc. rev.
denied, 295 N.C. 653, 248 S.E.2d 257 (1978).
5. See supra note 4. 4ccord Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712,
719 (4th Cir.) (Bryan, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 155 (1983).
6. 705 F.2d 712 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 155 (1983).
7. In Alantic Purchasersplaintiffs brought an action for fraud and breach of express warranty in connection with the purchase of an airplane. Id at 714. Plaintiffs alleged that the airplane's engines had been operated for more hours than defendants represented, that the necessary
airworthiness inspections had not been performed as claimed, and that the log books had been
doctored to substantiate these representations. Id The jury awarded compensatory damages of
$31,000 and punitive damages of $15,000. Id After the verdict was returned, plaintiffs moved to
treble the compensatory damages pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981), and sought attorneys' fees pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1 (1981). Plaintiffs had made no use of, or reference to, these statutory provisions prior to their motion. They denied that an award of punitive
damages was inconsistent with statutory treble damages and suggested that if they were inconsistent, "the punitive damages should be eliminated and the actual damages trebled." Atlantic Purchasers, 705 F.2d at 714-15. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed.
Although the court of appeals recognized that the jury's special verdict supported liability and
treble damages under §§ 75-1.1 and 75-16, they determined that granting plaintiffs' motion would
unfairly prejudice defendants. The court concluded: "Fundamental fairness requires in such a
case, where the statutory remedy may increase greatly the defendant's liability, that the opposing
party be notified of the possibility of the unusual relief prior to the plaintiffs tender of a proposed
judgment on the verdict." Id at 717.
8. Atlantic Purchasers,705 F.2d at 716 n.4. The dissenting opinion supported the availability of the statutory recovery. Moreover, the dissent argued that an award of punitive damages
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Carolina cases considering relief under section 75-1.1, of analogous North
Carolina statutes with multiple damage provisions, and of statutes and judicial
precedent in other jurisdictions, reveals the soundness of the court of appeals'
prediction. Moreover, an award of statutory treble and punitive damages exceeds the parameters of the statutory scheme envisioned by the legislature in
enacting section 75-1.1.
Analysis of this issue begins with a consideration of the substantive provisions of section 75-1.1 and the characteristics of treble and punitive damages.
Since the 1960's, North Carolina and most other states have enacted consumer
protection legislation 9 designed to parallel and supplement the Federal Trade
Commission Act.' 0 These state statutes were derived from various alternative
legislative schemes suggested to the states by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)" and the Commission on Uniform State Laws.' 2 The FTC encouraged such statutes because enforcement of the FTC Act's section 5 prohibition against "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"' 3 could not be
accomplished solely by the FTC. 14 In 1969 North Carolina adopted the
broadest of the suggested forms and enacted section 75-1.1.1 5 Although various common-law causes of action for unfair or deceptive trade practices had
been recognized in North Carolina,' 6 the General Assembly reacted favorably
to FTC encouragement of state legislation because the legislature perceived
that the common-law remedies were inadequate.' 7 Section 75-1.1, however,
does not supersede common-law causes of action. A plaintiff may pursue redoes not preclude an award of treble damages for a violation of§ 75-1.1. Id at 718-21 (Bryan, J.,
dissenting).
9. Although the North Carolina legislation was enacted in part to provide enhanced consumer protection, Morgan, The People'sAdvocate in the Marketplace-TheRole of the Norh Carolina Attorney Generalin the Fieldof ConsumerProtection,6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 1, 18-20
(1969), relief is not restricted to consumers. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981). See also Allantic Purchasers,705 F.2d 712 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 155 (1983); United Roasters, Inc. v.
Colgate Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981); Johnson v.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1982).
11. [T]he FTC offered three alternative drafts of an Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law: Alternate Form No. 1 contains the broad language of § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act prohibiting "unfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices" in trade or commerce; Alternate Form No. 2 outlaws all
forms of fraudulent, deceptive and sometimes unfair acts or practices in trade or commerce; and Alternate Form No. 3 itemizes the deceptive practices proscribed, and usually contains a "catch-all" clause reaching all other forms of deception.
Leaffer & Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices., The Private
Uses of FederalTrade Commission Jurisprudence,48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 521-22 n.2 (1980).
12. Id. at 521-22.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982).
14. Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 11, at 522.
15. Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930.
16. See, e.g., Roberson v. Williams, 240 N.C. 696, 83 S.E.2d 811 (1954) (fraud). The North
Carolina courts have continued to recognize common-law unfair trade practices since 1969. See
Gritffn v. Wheeler Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557 (1976) (implied warranty); Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 209 S.E.2d 494 (1974) (fraud).
17. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543-44, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981).

1984]

1141

COMMERCIAL LAW

lief under the common law and section 75-1.1 in the same action.' 8
Unlike the FTC Act, which does not provide for a private cause of action
based on its violation,' 9 section 75-16 allows a private cause of action and
provides treble damages2 0 to encourage private enforcement of section 751.1. 2 1 Trebling damages "makes more economically feasible the bringing of
an action where the possible damages are limited."2 2 The North Carolina
Supreme Court also has recognized that: "The statute is partially punitive in

nature in that it clearly serves as a deterrent to future violations.

'2 3

As an

scheme provides for the award of attorneys'
additional deterrent, the statutory
24

fees for willful misconduct.

The legislature did not define what constitutes "unfair methods of compe-

tition" or "unfair or deceptive trade practices"; the scope of section 75-1.1 and
the conduct that it proscribes are to be defined by the courts. 25 The North

Carolina Supreme Court has determined that a violation of section 75-1.1 and
an award of treble damages pursuant to section 75-16 do not require intentional wrongdoing by the defendant.2 6 The defendant is judged on the effect
of his actions rather than his intent.27 The court also has established a bifur-

cated private-action procedure. Initially, the jury determines the facts. The
court then determines, as a matter of law, whether the defendant engaged in

28
unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive trade practices. If it
finds a violation, the court must treble the compensatory damages that are

29
established by the jury's fact finding.

18. See Abernathy v. Ralph Squires Realty Co., 55 N.C. App. 354, 358, 285 S.E.2d 325, 327
(1982).
19. See Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720, 730 (9th Cir. 1981); Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d
1243, 1249 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979). See also 4 R. CALLMANN, THE
LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES, § 24.01 (4th ed. 1983).
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1981). Section 75-16 was enacted in 1913 as part of the original Chapter 75: Monopolies, Trusts and Consumer Protection. Act of Mar. 3. 1913, ch. 41, § 14,
1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 66. All provisions of Chapter 75 are subject to the treble damage provision
of § 75-16, except § 75-56 (regulating debt collection practices). Accordingly, when § 75-1.1 was
enacted in 1969 it became subject to § 75-16 as well. See Aycock, North CarolinaLaw on Antitrust
and Consumer Protection, 60 N.C.L. REv. 205, 258 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Aycock, North
Carolina]. In 1977, § 75-16 was amended to delete the requirement that damages be assessed by
the jury, thus making the award of treble damages automatic if compensatory damages were assessed. See id at 258 n.365. See generally Aycock, Antitrust and Unfair Trade PracticeLaw in
North Carolina-FederalLaw Compared, 50 N.C.L. REv. 199 (1972).
21. See Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 229, 235, 259 S.E.2d 1, 5, disc. rev.
denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979).
22. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 549, 276 S.E.2d 397, 404 (1981).
23. Id. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
25. See Aycock, North Carolina,supra note 20, at 211. For a discussion of the judicial interpretation of unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive trade practices under 75-1.1,
see generally N. ALLEN, ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION: THE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA
§§ 10-2, 10-3 (1982); Aycock, North Carolina,supranote 20 at 211-23; Comment, The Trouble with
Trebles.- What Violates G.S. § 75-L1?, 5 CAMPBELL L. REv. 119, 123-57 (1982).
26. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 545-46, 276 S.E.2d 397, 401-402 (1981).
27. Id at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403.
28. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 310, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346-47 (1975).
29. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 547, 276 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-16 (1981).
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Although both treble and punitive damages are awards in excess of com-

pensatory damages, the justification for awarding statutory treble damages
pursuant to section 75-16 contrasts sharply with the common-law justification
for punitive damages. The treble damage provision has been recognized as
partially punitive in nature and partially an encouragement to private enforcement. 30 Punitive damages, however, are awarded for the sole purpose of punishing and deterring others from similar behavior. 3 1 Unlike an award of
treble damages under section 75-16, an award of punitive damages requires a
showing of "intentional wrongdoing, ' 32 "willful conduct,"33 or "outrageous
conduct."

34

Because treble and punitive damages serve different purposes and are not
awarded for the same policy reasons, it has been argued that a plaintiff should

be able to recover both measures of damage.35 Furthermore, the availability

of punitive and treble damages for violations of section 75-1.1 arguably effectuates the state's goals of punishment, deterrence and encouragement of private enforcement. 36 Opponents, however, contend that treble and punitive

damages are mutually exclusive. They argue that an award of both is duplica-

tive because each measure has a punitive element.3 7 The resolution of this

conflict can be advanced by considering North Carolina cases involving unfair
methods of competition or unfair or deceptive trade practices and by analyzing analogous statutes in North Carolina and other jurisdictions. Ultimately,
however, legislative intent should govern the resolution of this controversy.

The issue whether treble and punitive damages are mutually exclusive
arises when a plaintiff pursues, in the same suit, a cause of action for a violation of section 75-1.1 and a common-law cause of action. The plaintiff could
seek treble damages for the statutory violation and punitive damages for the
30. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text; Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C.
App. 229, 237, 259 S.E.2d 1, 6, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979).
31. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 112-13, 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1976).
32. Id
33. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 306, 218 S.E.2d 342, 344-45 (1975).
34. Id To determine punitive damage, the court submits a separate punitive damage issue to
the jury and instructs the jurors that such an award should not be made if they have not found
compensatory damages. The propriety and amount of punitive damages, however, is within the
complete discretion of the jury. See Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 111, 229
S.E.2d 297, 300-01 (1976); Phillips v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 43 N.C. App. 53, 56, 257
S.E.2d 671, 673 (1979).
35. See, e.g. ,Atlantic Purchasers,705 F.2d at 718-20 (Bryan, J., dissenting); Roberts & Martz,
Consumerism Comes of Age: Treble Damages and Attorney Fees in Consumer Transactions-The
Ohio Consumer Sales PracticesAct, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 927, 959 (1981); Note, Consumer Protection-Hardy v. Toler. Applying the North CarolinaDeceptive Trade Practices Legislation- What
Rolefor the Jury?, 54 N.C.L. REv.963, 965 n.15 (1976). Cf.Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d
873 (8th Cir. 1979) (although reversed, the district court awarded treble and punitive damages for
a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act); John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 198
N.W.2d 363 (1972) (although reversed, the Wisconsin Circuit Court awarded treble and punitive
damages for a violation of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act).
36. See Parker, The Deterrent Effect of Punitive Treble Damage Suits: Fact or Fantasy, 3
N.M.L. REv. 286, 287 (1973).
37. See, e.g.,Atlantic Purchasers,705 F.2d at 716 n.4; Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 312, 218
S.E.2d 342, 348 (1975) (Huskins, J., concurring); Roberts & Martz, supra note 35, at 959. See also
infra note 78 and accompanying text.
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common-law violation.38 The North Carolina Court of Appeals has determined that both theories may be submitted to the jury.39 Consequently, in the

same action a jury might award compensatory damages, find a common-law
violation, and establish facts constituting a violation of section 75-1.1, which
would entitle plaintiff to treble damages. 40 If the common-law violation in-

volved intentional wrongdoing, the jury conceivably could award punitive
damages as well.4 1 The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however, has also
determined that a plaintiff may recover under the statutory or common-law
cause of action, but not under both.4 2 Thus, it appears that the plaintiff would
be required to choose a theory of recovery after the verdict is returned. 43 Be-

cause each measure is tied to a specific theory of recovery, the plaintiff's
choice of a theory would be an election of remedies.44 A plaintiff could not

choose the statutory theory and receive treble as well as punitive damages-the
measures of damage would be mutually exclusive.

The foregoing conclusion does not resolve the treble/punitive issue. A
plaintiff might pursue a section 75-1.1 cause of action seeking treble damages

pursuant to section 75-16 and punitive damages for the statutory violation on
the basis of intentional wrongdoing. Again, a jury might award compensatory
and punitive damages and find facts constituting a violation of section 75-1.1.
Because an election between theories of recovery would be unnecessary, a
court would be faced squarely with the mutual exclusivity question. Although

the North Carolina courts never have considered the availability of commonlaw punitive damages in this context, they have considered the availability of
punitive damages in connection with other North Carolina statutes that pro-

vide for multiple damage recovery.
North Carolina General Statutes section 20-348 provides for an award of
treble damages to those injured by a violation of the North ,Carolina Vehicle
Mileage Act. 45 In Roberts v. Buffaloe 46 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
38. See, e.g., Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975); Gower v. Strout Realty,
Inc., 56 N.C. App. 603, 289 S.E.2d 880 (1982); Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 229,
259 S.E.2d 1,disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979); Rosenthal v. Perkins, 42 N.C.
App. 449, 257 S.E.2d 63 (1979); Stone v. Paradise Park Homes, Inc., 37 N.C. App. 97, 245 S.E.2d
801, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 653, 248 S.E.2d 257 (1978).
39. See Abernathy v. Ralph Squires Realty Co., 55 N.C. App. 354, 358, 285 S.E.2d 325, 327
(1982). See also United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 990-91 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981) (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981) diversity action).
40. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
42. See Marshall v. Miller, 47 N.C. App. 530, 541-42, 268 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1980), modfled on
othergrounds, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981); Stone v. Paradise Park Homes, Inc., 37 N.C.
App. 97, 105-06, 245 S.E.2d 801, 807-08, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 653, 248 S.E.2d 257 (1978). See
also Atlantic Purchasers,705 F.2d at 716 n.4.
43. The North Carolina courts that have considered a suit such as the hypothetical described
here did not address the availability of treble and punitive damages. Although none of these
courts awarded both remedies, the results were reached on grounds other than mutual exclusivity.
See supra note 38.
44. Presumably the plaintiff could elect the cause of action and accompanying measure of
damage which yielded the largest award.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-340 to -350 (1983).
46. 43 N.C. App. 368, 258 S.E.2d 861 (1979).
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rejected the possibility of an award of punitives along with the treble damage
remedy. 47 The court ruled that common-law punitive damages were pre48
cluded by the statute.
North Carolina General Statutes section 1-539.1 provides for an award of
double damages to those injured by a wrongful cutting of timber, under trespass. At common law, damages for wrongful timber cutting could be enhanced, as a penal measure, if the trespasser was a "knowing wrongdoer." 49
Such damages were calculated by valuing the timber where cut and enhancing
that measure by the value added by the trespasser's labors. Thus, the plaintiff
was awarded the full value of the timber as held or disposed by the defendant.5 0 In Jones v. Georgia-PacocCorp.51 plaintiff sought double damages pur-

suant to section 1-539.1 and enhanced damages. The North Carolina Court of
Appeals rejected such an award. The court characterized the common-law
enhanced damage measure and the statutory damages as mutually exclusive.5 2
The above decisions suggest that the North Carolina courts would find
punitive and treble damages for violation of section 75-1.1 to be mutually exclusive. Court interpretations of the "little FTC Acts" of other states also are
instructive in resolving the punitive/treble damage issue. Legislation concerning unfair trade practices and consumer protection now has been enacted in
forty-eight other states.5 3 These statutes, however, offer limited assistance. Of
the forty-eight, only one-third provide for multiple damages.5 4 Many of the
states that provide for multiple damages also require a showing of intentional
misconduct.5 5 Because an award of treble damages under section 75-16 does
not require intentional misconduct,5 6 it can be argued that punitive damages
should be allowed when such conduct is present. In states where intentional
misconduct is required for an award of multiple damages, the argument for
punitive damages is less persuasive. These jurisdictions appear to have incor57
porated a punitive damages remedy into the statute.
47. id at 372, 258 S.E.2d at 863.
48. Id The analogy between N.C. GEN STAT. § 75-16 (1981) and Id. § 20-348 (1983) is defective in one respect. A violation of§ 75-1.1 and an award of treble damages under § 75-16 does
not require a showing of intentional wrongdoing. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
A violation of § 20-348, however, requires a showing that the defendant acted with "intent to
defraud." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-348 (1983). Although it could be argued that punitive damages
should be available for intentional wrongdoing that violates § 75-1.1, such an argument is less
persuasive regarding § 20-348. Roberts, however, was not decided on this ground.
49. Dobbs, Trespass to Land in North Carolina.- PartIL Remediesfor Trespass, 47 N.C.L.
REv. 334, 336-37 (1969).
50. Id
51. 15 N.C. App. 515, 190 S.E.2d 422 (1972).
52. Id at 518, 190 S.E.2d at 424.
53. See Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 11, at 531.
54. See id at 560-64. "Multiple damages" refers to the doubling or trebling of compensatory
damages.
55. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(c) (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409A (West
Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 11 ('West 1975 & Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 39-5-140 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(a) (1979).
56. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
57. Put see Colonial Lincoln-Mercury Sales, Inc. v. Molina, 152 Ga. App. 379, 382, 262
S.E.2d 820, 823 (1979) (although recognizing that a violation of the Georgia unfair trade practice
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Those states that do not require intentional misconduct have not addressed the mutual exclusivity issue.58 Although the North Carolina courts

have emphasized that treble damages serve to encourage private enforcement, 59 other "nonintentional" jurisdictions highlight the punitive aspect of
such an award. 60 This emphasis weighs against the award of punitive damages in addition to multiple damages. 6 1 Thus, it appears that many states
might find multiple damages and punitive damages to be mutually exclusive
in an unfair or deceptive trade practice action. Because the language and in-

terpretation of the North Carolina statutes differ significantly from other jurisdictions, however, the applicability of this conclusion to sections 75-1.1 and

75-16 is limited.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that federal decisions interpreting the FTC Act may be used as guidance in determining the conduct that

constitutes a violation of section 75-1.1.62 Because the FTC Act does not provide for a private cause of action, however, it does not provide an analogy for

resolving whether punitive damages may be recovered when treble damages
are awarded under section 75-16. As noted by the North Carolina Supreme

Court: "[TIhe provisions for private enforcement found in [section 75-16] are
more closely analogous to Section 4 of the Clayton Act,[ 631 which provides for

private suits with treble damage recovery for violation of federal antitrust
laws." 64 The federal courts consistently have ruled that punitive damages are

unavailable to a plaintiff who is awarded treble damages65 for a violation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act. 66 These courts have characterized treble damages

as punitive, and accordingly, they view punitive damages as a double recovstatutes required intentional conduct, the court suggested that punitive damages were "permissible" along with an award of "mandatory" treble damages under the statute).
58. See, e.g., Roberts & Martz, supra note 35, at 958 ("not clear" whether a plaintiff can
recover treble damages under the Ohio unfair trade practice statutes and also recover punitive
damages).
59. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 77 N.J. 267, 274-75, 390 A.2d 566, 571
(1978) (Pashman, J., concurring). Cf.Bailey Employment Sys. v. Hahn, 545 F. Supp. 62, 73 (D.
Conn. 1982) (punitive damages allowable under Connecticut unfair trade practice statutes in
judge's discretion; court awarded compensatory damages doubled).
61. But see D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(1) (1981) (no requirement of intentional conduct
to show violation of District of Columbia unfair trade practice statutes, but treble damages and
punitive damages enumerated as possible awards).
62. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 542,276 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1981); Johnson v. Phoenix
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 262-63, 266 S.E,2d 610, 620-21 (1980); Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C.
303, 308, 218 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1975).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
64. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 542, 276 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1981).
65. See, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 888 (8th Cir. (1979); Hansen Packing
Co. v. Armour & Co., 16 F. Supp. 784, 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) Cf. Hometowne Builders, Inc. v.
Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 477 F. Supp. 717, 719-20 (E.D. Va. 1979) (finding "duplicative" an award of
punitive damages along with the treble damage recovery of 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1982), an "addition
to the antitrust laws"). See also John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 409, 198
N.W.2d 363, 367-68 (1972) (noting that while the Wisconsin version of the Sherman Antitrust Act
was designed to encourage private enforcement and punish violators, the award of punitives with
statutory trebles "would amount to double recovery of a penalty and thus violate the basic fairness
of a judicial proceeding required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
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ery. 67 Treble damages are an exclusive remedy for the violation of the federal
antitrust statutes. 68 Since the North Carolina courts have relied heavily on
federal decisions interpreting section 5 of the FTC Act when interpreting section 75-1.1, the federal decisions concerning the availability of punitive and
treble damages for violations of the federal antitrust laws also are instructive.
These decisions suggest that the North Carolina courts would find punitive
and treble damages to be mutually exclusive.
In Marshall v. Miller69 the North Carolina Supreme Court considered
whether a violation of section 75-1.1 should require a showing of intentional
wrongdoing. The court recognized that legislative intent should govern its determination. 70 Likewise, legislative intent ultimately should govern whether
punitive and treble damages are mutually exclusive under sections 75-1.1 and
75-16. Although the foregoing consideration of analogous statutes, both
within and without the state, is instructive on how the North Carolina courts
should resolve this issue, a sounder approach is to attempt to effectuate the
legislature's statutory intent.
The void left by the lack of written legislative history regarding section
75-1.1 has been filled by the judiciary. As declared by the courts, the essence
of the legislative intent was to supplement the common law in the area of
unfair or deceptive trade practices, 7 1 to encourage private enforcement,7 2 and
to provide a punitive measure. 73 Thus, the General Assembly enacted section
75-1.1 creating "an entirely statutory cause of action"'74 and provided the existing treble damage provision of section 75-16 as the remedy for that cause of
action. The result was a cause of action "broader than traditional common
law actions," 75 an "expansion" of the common law, 7 6 and a remedy more easily recovered than remedies at common law. 7 7 Thus, it is inconsistent with this
scheme to interject common-law punitive damages upon the showing of intentional wrongdoing, an element not required under section 75-16.
The inconsistency between punitive damages and legislative intent is most
apparent when considering the punitive intent of the treble damage provision.
An award of treble damages under section 75-16 represents both an incentive
67. See supra note 65.
68. Hansen Packing Co. v. Armour & Co., 16 F. Supp. 784, 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
69. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
70. Id at 543, 276 S.E.2d at 400.
71. See id
72. See id; State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 320, 233 S.E.2d 895, 900
(1977); Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 229,237, 259 S.E.2d 1, 6, disc.rev. denied, 298
N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979).
73. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402; Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C.

App. 229, 237, 259 S.E.2d 1,6, disc. rev, denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979).
74. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
75. .Id at 547, 276 S.E.2d at 402.

76. Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 229, 241, 259 S.E.2d 1,9, disc. rev. denied,
298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979).
77. For example, although at common law actionable fraud required an "intent to deceive,"
Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 138, 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (1974), an award of treble damages
for a violation of § 75-1.1 does not require intentional wrongdoing. See s6pra notes 26-27 and
accompanying text.
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for private enforcement and a punitive measure. The award is one; it cannot
be apportioned between these aspects. Necessarily, an additional award of
punitive damages overlaps and duplicates the punitive portion of treble damages. It would be a double recovery, prohibited in North Carolina, to the
extent that the treble award represents a punitive element. 7 8 Thus, punitive
damages and a treble damage recovery under section 75-16 should be deemed
mutually exclusive.
It could be argued that because the statutory cause of action does not,
require intentional wrongdoing, the outrageous conduct associated with intentional wrongdoing demands an additional punitive remedy. This argument is
particularly appealing when compensatory damages, even when trebled, result
in a minimal award.79 The response is two-fold. First, the legislature contemplated intentional conduct in connection with a violation of section 75-1.1.
Under North Carolina General Statutes section 75-16.1, a plaintiff injured by

a violation of section 75-1.1 may recover attorneys' fees upon a showing that
the defendant acted "willfully."

Section 75-16.1 also was intended to en-

courage private enforcement.8 0 Although the award of attorneys' fees is not a
punitive provision, it does enable the plaintiff to recover an increased award
for intentional wrongdoing.8 1 Had the legislature intended punitive damages
to be available in connection with violations of section 75-1.1, they would have
provided such a remedy for intentional wrongdoing.

Second, in cases involving intentional wrongdoing in which treble damages are minimal, the plaintiff may pursue a common-law cause of action and

seek punitive damages. Since a plaintiff may pursue the common-law and the
statutory causes of action in the same suit,8 2 if punitive damages are warranted

and are awarded by the jury, he may elect such a remedy in lieu of the statu-

83
tory treble damages.

78. See Smith v. Gulf Oil Corp., 239 N.C. 360, 368, 79 S.E.2d 880, 885 (1954); Marshall v.
Miller, 47 N.C. App. 530, 542, 268 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1980), modfiedon othergrounds, 302 N.C. 539,
276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
79. Cf. J. STEIN,

DAMAGES AND RECOVERY: PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH ACTIONS §

198

(1972).
80. See Marshall, 302 N.C. at 549, 276 S.E.2d at 404. In Marshall, the court stated:
We further note that G.S. 75-16.1 also provides that an unsuccessful plaintiff may be
charged with defendant's attorney fees should the court find that "It]he party instituting
the action knew, or should have known, the action was frivolous and malicious." This is
an important counterweight designed to inhibit the bringing of spurious lawsuits which
the liberal damage provisions of G.S. 75-16 might otherwise encourage.
Id Thus, it is doubtful that the court would liberalize further the damages available for a violation of § 75-1.1 by legitimizing an award of punitive damages.
81. Like punitive damages, an award of attorneys' fees under § 75-16.1 requires a finding by
the jury of some amount of compensatory damages.' Compare supra note 34 and accompanying
text with Mayton v. Hiatt's Used Cars, Inc., 45 N.C. App. 206, 212, 262 S.E.2d 860, 864, disc. rev.
denied, 300 N.C. 198, 269 S.E.2d 624 (1980) (court denied an award of attorneys' fees because
plaintiff did not suffer actual injury).
82. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. Cf. B.B. Walker Co. v. Ashland Chem.
Co., 474 F. Supp. 651 (M.D.N.C. 1979). In Walker, plaintiff sued under both the North Carolina
common law of unfair competition and § 75-1.1. Although the statute of limitations applicable to
the statute had expired, plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages of $10 and punitive dam-
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One final ground for the mutual exclusivity of punitive and treble dam-

ages exists. Punitive damages should not be used to supplement a statutory
scheme in which treble damages have been provided explicitly and no provi-

sion has been made for additional damages. When considering the availability of punitive damages along with double damages under the North Carolina

statute governing wrongful cutting of timber,8 4 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals stated:
It is settled law that statutes in derogation of the common law or
statutes imposing a penalty must be strictly construed. Strict construction.

. .

requires that everything be excluded from the opera-

tion of the statute which does not come within the scope of the
language8 5used, taking the words in their natural and ordinary
meaning.
Because section 75-1.1 is in "derogation of the common law" causes of action

87
for unfair or deceptive trade practices8 6 and section 75-16 imposes a penalty,
strict construction is in order. Absent explicit legislative inclusion, punitive
damages should be excluded from the statutory scheme.8 8 Punitive damages

and treble damages should be mutually exclusive.

In conclusion, the North Carolina cases that have interpreted sections 751.1 and 75-16 and the interpretations of analogous statutes within and without
North Carolina suggest that the North Carolina courts should conclude that
statutory treble damages and punitive damages are mutually exclusive. More
importantly, the North Carolina courts' interpretation of the legislative intent
suggests that the two measures should be mutually exclusive. Until the courts

or legislature resolve this issue, however, the prudent plaintiff should pursue
punitive damages under both the common-law and statutory causes of action.
CHRISTOPHER BLAIR CAPEL

ages of $250,000 under the common-law cause of action. Pursuant to § 75-16, recovery would
have been limited to treble damages of $30.
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.1 (1982). See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
85. Jones v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 15 N.C. App. 515, 518, 190 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1972) (citations omitted).
86. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
87. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
88. Cf. Hometowne Builders, Inc. v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 477 F. Supp. 717, 719 (E.D. Va.
1979) (in construing a federal antitrust treble damage provision, the court stated: "The absence of
any discussion [in the legislative history] of punitive damages in excess of treble damages is a
strong indication that such damages were not contemplated by Congress and were not implied in
the statute."); Marshall, 302 N.C. at 547, 276 S.E.2d at 402 ("Absent statutory language making
trebling discretionary with the trial judge, we must conclude that the Legislature intended trebling
of any damages assessed to be automatic once a violation is shown."); John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v.
Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 409, 198 N.W.2d 363, 367 (1972) (because the Wisconsin antitrust statute
explicitly creates treble damages, the statutory remedy is exclusive of punitive damages).
If the North Carolina legislature had intended punitive damages to be available, it could have
enumerated trebles as well as punitives, as has been done in the District of Columbia. See D.C.
CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(1) (1981).

